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Wilder v. Bernstein: Squeeze Play By
Consent Decree
Richard A. Epsteint

I.

BIND OR COMPROMISE?

One of the major concerns with consent decrees is their capacity to bind third parties. The point is an old one. If consent decrees are variants of contracts, then their scope and power should
be subject to the same limitations that are appropriate to private
contracts.' It is settled today that no contract between A and B
can bind C. It should follow that consent decrees are subject to the
same limitation for the protection of strangers. This proposition
can be defended from two perspectives. As a matter of general political theory, any alternative rule would lead to intolerable social
consequences. To be sure, today there are few contracts that in
overt form seek to bind strangers. But if the legal rule were otherwise, the primary conduct of many people would change, and a
new full scale industry would emerge: everyone would enter into
comfortable agreements with their friends in order to expropriate
the wealth of their enemies, only to discover that they are victims
of the same ploy as done by others. A risk so substantial to the
social fabric is rightly expected to elicit some powerful legal response, and so it has. The effort by A and B to bind C by contract
fares no better than an effort by A and B to take what C owns.
Both are forms of theft. Within the judicial arena this substantive
argument is bolstered by a constitutional point: any system of justice which allows A and B to bind C is subject to serious procedural due process concerns,2 where C has no opportunity to defend
himself, and thus to invoke the principle that contracts cannot
bind strangers.

t James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I would like to thank
Frank Easterbrook, Larry Kramer, Michael McConnell, and David Strauss for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. They have saved me from many
serious errors. The usual caveat applies with respect to those errors which still remain.
I See Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. 19, 20; Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103, 104.
2 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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The power of this principle is, however, limited by the scope
of its key term: the capacity to bind others by contract. There are
ways to hurt other parties without binding them. When parties understand that some strict legal or constitutional rule prevents them
from binding strangers, they are not necessarily driven to inaction.
They may search for some way to compromise or prejudice the
interests of others, even as they do not diminish their legal rights.
In a sense, it is a tautology to say that efforts to impose such costs
upon others must be regarded as lawful precisely because they do
not limit the rights of those whose welfare has been reduced. The
common law notion of damnum absque injuria, for example, was
but a Latin formulation of the general principle that some hurts
are simply not compensable: certain harms (damnum) did not constitute legal injury (injuria) cognizable by our courts. Yet the ability to inflict these external costs is a serious social concern if it
leads to a pattern of challenge and response that in the end
reduces the welfare of all parties to the game. There may be no
way to change legal rights to deal with this risk, but an increased
social awareness of the problem involved may create a set of informal social sanctions that will cope with the problem of real losses
inflicted upon strangers.
The distinction between binding strangers and compromising
their interest by consent decree is critical for understanding the
protracted litigation in Wilder v. Bernstein. The consent decree
entered by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the
City of New York in Wilder v. Bernstein, represents a case where
the parties to the consent decree labored with considerable success
to impose substantial costs upon third parties, here chiefly Catholic and Jewish charities with whom the City had long done business. 4 It is therefore useful to discuss the case briefly to give some
sense of the dangers (some might say possibilities) that lurk behind consent decrees, especially in the context of public interest
litigation.

' 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Earlier stages in this massive litigation are reported in Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and Wilder v. Bernstein,
499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The named plaintiffs were black Protestant children who
were represented by the ACLU, which controlled the litigation for the class. Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr. was at the time Corporation Counsel, the chief lawyer for New York City. Burt
Neuborne, a Professor of Law at New York University, headed the ACLU efforts in this
litigation. The use of "ACLU" is a convenient shorthand for the plaintiffs in this case.
Presentation by Burt Neuborne at the University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium, November 15, 1986.
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II.

WILDER V. BERNSTEIN

The basic situation in Wilder was as follows. For many years
the city of New York had entered into contracts with both the
Catholic and Jewish charities of New York for the joint operation
of certain efforts to help poor and needy children in the city of
New York. Prior to these contracts both religious groups had
maintained extensive child-care facilities of their own. Their efforts were supported with moneys raised largely from voluntary
contributions from their memberships. The Charities used these
funds to provide welfare assistance to their coreligionists. The City
provided welfare assistance to other children in the City; black
Protestant children were the chief beneficiaries of these programs.
It was agreed on all sides that the religious organizations were far
better at providing needy children with the appropriate services.
6
The outgrowth was a series of one-year contractse-the
length of
the contract term becomes critical to the legal analysis-between
the City and the Charities whereby the City agreed to fund some
of the costs associated with the operation of religious institutions,
while the religious Charities in exchange agreed to provide services
to the children for whom the City had primary responsibility of
care. Over time the extent of public support for the religious Charities grew, until at present it accounts for about 70 percent of their
total budgets.7 As their responsibilities increased, the Charities
committed a larger and larger fraction of their resources to facilities that could operate only with continued City support.
The program was, at least by some measures, a success. It was
agreed on all sides that the religious organizations continued to offer care to their coreligionists, which was superior to the care that
these same organizations provided to the City's children8 under

The dynamics of the Wilder consent decree negotiations between the ACLU and the
city of New York was the subject of a presentation by Burt Neuborne and Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr. at the University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium, "Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal Dilemmas," held at the University of Chicago Law School on November 15, 1986. A somewhat expanded version of their presentation can be found in Burt
Neuborne and Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., A Prelude to the Settlement of Wilder, 1987 U.
Chi. Legal F. 177.
6 "It is undisputed that those contracts typically are of one year's duration and are
renegotiated at the end of the contract period." Wilder, 645 F. Supp at 1344.
See Neuborne and Schwarz, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 178 (cited in note 5).
8 I use the term "City's children" with some trepidation because of the possible inference that the City is the parent of the children in question. The reference here is only
shorthand for the obvious point that these are children brought into the system through the
City agencies. Black Protestant children constitute the bulk of the City's children, but
others are clearly involved.
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contract, which was in turn superior to the levels of care which the
City had been able to provide for its own children. The exact nature of the differences in services provided for coreligionists and
City children is somewhat difficult to ascertain from the reported
opinion. It is very clear that one source of difference had to do
with access to the system. Before the litigation the Charities gave
preference in admission to their coreligionists. In effect there were
two separate queues; to make the differences most stark, the last
person in the first, coreligionist queue always had an advantage
over the first person in the second queue.9 There may have been
some differences in quality of services provided after admission to
the facility, but this is not evident from the language of the consent decree (which concentrates heavily on the access point). And
it is very difficult to see how the Charities could, even if they were
so inclined, have systematically varied the standard services-quality of food, cleanliness of common areas-that coreligionists and City children had within a single facility. It is of
course possible to envision different levels of support being provided for ancillary services, such as counselling, which are provided
on a discretionary and individual basis. But again, on this point
the record itself is silent.
For our purposes, however, the sources of the difference in service quality between coreligionists and City children does not bulk
very large. The fact of the difference seems to be more important
to the analysis than the source of that difference. Hence, I shall
look at the case on the simplified assumption that coreligionists
received "better" care than city children from the Charities, but
that City children received "better" care from the Charities than
they would have received if the City had run its own separate
operation.
It is dangerous of course to attach numerical values to the
quality of care that was provided in the alternative states of the
world. Nonetheless, it becomes instructive simply to postulate certain values which are in rough agreement with the above assumptions. Assume, therefore, that before the joint agreement between
the City and the Charities, the level of care provided by the Charities to their children was at 20, while the level provided by the
' Note that this strong assumption is not necessary to show the difference in access. It
would be quite sufficient to show that the probabilities of getting certain types of care were
simply a function bf which queue a child was in. But those complications, while relevant on
the question of the extent of the differences, do not seem critical for the exposition that
follows, which turns only on an access preference. Hence the complications are ignored.
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City to its children was 5. Assume afterward that the Charities
were able to provide a care level of 24 to their own children, and a
level of 10 to the City's children. To make the analysis easy, at
least for the moment, assume that there were no changes in the
total resources committed to the care of the poor, either by the
Charities or the City. On these assumptions, both sides gained
from the bargain solely by the more efficient deployment of available resources. 10 As stated, the numbers suggest that the City children gained more from the deal than did the Charity's, but the
numbers could be altered to make the reverse true, without altering the basic structure of the argument.
These arrangements between the City and the Charities were
attacked in a suit by the ACLU. For our purposes there were three
essential components to the ACLU's overall position. First, there
was an Establishment Clause issue. The question was whether it
was proper for the City and the Charities to enter into any longterm cooperative arrangement at all. This issue could appear in
one of two guises. Foremost, there was a serious question of
whether the preexisting arrangements between the City and the
Charities ran afoul of the Establishment Clause. Here the key concern was that private religious organizations were using public financing to advance religious purposes.1 ' There was the further
question of whether any altered plan, such as the one approved by
the consent decree, was inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause because it contemplated a heightened supervision and involvement of public aid officials in the operations of religious charities. 2 Establishment Clause law is often regarded as an inpenetrable jungle, from which no short article can promise any means
o This analysis ignores any conflicts of interest that might occur within either the
Charities or the City. On the question of whether government officials should be able to
bind future administrations, see Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 33-41 (cited in note

1).

U See Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
Plaintiffs allege specifically that the [child-care] system involves government financing of agencies that are controlled by or responsible to religious organizations;
that certain of these agencies employ clerics or members of religious orders, or
give preference in employment to those of the same religion; that many of them
offer religious services only of their own faith; that children in their care attend
parochial schools or yeshivas; that they prominently display religious symbols on
their premises and on special days of religious observance; that many of the agencies share or adjoin premises occupied by a religious order or organization; and
that the stated purpose of many Catholic or Jewish agencies is to care for children
of their own religion.
2 See id. at 1329-40.
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of escape. 3 It is enough to note that the general tests used to approach this question derive from Lemon v. Kurtzman:4 "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
The second of the ACLU's concerns was with the Free Exercise Clause. In principle, free exercise issues could be raised both
by the plaintiff children and by the Charities on behalf of their
own children. Here the plaintiffs' case was that there were no Protestant charities in New York City, and that Protestant children
were denied their free exercise of religion when placed in Catholic
or Jewish charities. The Charities, for their part, asserted that the
provision of religious services for their coreligionists is a central
part of their own mission, which is to preserve the total religious
environment found in the families of their coreligionists."5 That religious environment can be preserved only if the City is limited in
the control that it exerts over charitable institutions. The final settlement as approved by the Court acknowledged that these claims
by the Charities placed some limitations upon the ability of the
City to assign children to particular care facilities on a "first come,
first serve" basis. But the exception so recognized was narrowly
limited to "extraordinary circumstances [where] religious beliefs
and practices so pervade a child's life that a particular religious
placement is required."' 6
The third, and most insistent, element of the ACLU suit was
an "equal access claim," premised upon the Equal Protection
Clause. The gist of this claim was that it was wholly impermissible
for the City to sponsor and support with public funds, private organizations that provided higher levels of care to white Catholic
and Jewish children than they did to the Protestant black children
7
for whom the City had primary responsibility.
" For a more complete discussion of Establishment Clause law, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
" 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
x' The full extent of the limitations placed on the internal operations of the Charities is
unclear from the court's opinion, but the account in the New York Times suggests that the
provision prohibiting the religious organizations from imposing their religious beliefs on
others "when translated from the legal language-means that children in foster care agencies must be given access to contraception and abortion services." Joyce Purnick, O'Connor
Says He'll Drop Some Foster-Care Pacts With City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1987 pp. 29-30,
col. 2.
'6 Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1305.
See id. at 1302.
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These three issues in the complaint suffered very different
fates in the consent arrangement between the ACLU and the City.
Both parties agreed that the Establishment Clause issue would not
be pressed.' 8 They also agreed that the equal access claim was
sound, indeed indubitably so, and required that a strong presumption in favor of equal access, on a first come first serve basis, be
established in all facilities supported by City funds-subject only
to those few cases in which the Charities would be allowed to prefer their own coreligionists in placement issues. The final consent
decree embodied very detailed determinations of the types of arrangements that the City was entitled to enter into with the Charities, and severely limited the rights of the Charities to make placement decisions within their own facility, transferring that power to
either City official or neutral experts, consistent with the broader
understandings set out above. 9
This settlement was worked out after protracted litigation and
negotiation between the ACLU and the City. The consent decree
was vigorously opposed by the Charities, whose efforts as objecting
defendants to block its approval were decisively rebuffed by the
trial judge. The reason for the Charities' failure has to do with the
standards of intervention applicable in these cases. Quite simply,
the Charities were not parties who had full-fledged legal interests
that entitled them to intervene as a matter of right in the underlying dispute between the ACLU and the City. The simplest explanation for this result is that the City had entered into no long-term
contractual arrangements with the Charities but had instead entered into a series of one-year renewable (and hence cancellable)

Plaintiffs allege specifically that there are disproportionately low black and high
white populations in Jewish and Catholic agencies; that the referral of children to
voluntary agencies by New York City's Special Services for Children (SSC), and
the placement of children by the agencies in specific programs has resulted in
racial segregation; that racial discrimination by the agencies has been facilitated
by SSC's identification of children for placement by race and/or skin color, and by
the agencies' unrestricted right to reject children placed with them by SSC under
broad, subjective admissions criteria; that agencies are reimbursed by SSC for
children who apply directly to the agency rather than being referred by a City
placement office; and that some agencies have listed vacancies by race.
"SSee id. at 1353.
Thus, for example, the continuation of SSC's contractual relationship with sectarian child care agencies reflects a moderation of plaintiffs' Establishment Clause
claims in furtherance of other of their goals, chiefly the elimination of racial and
religious discrimination against black Protestant children within New York City's
existing foster care system, and the protection of those children's Free Exercise
rights while in the care of religiously affiliated agencies.
" For a summary of the terms of the Stipulation, see id. at 1304-07.
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contracts with them. The Charities were not, however, wholly out
' 20
in the cold, but were instead entitled to a "fairness hearing,
which essentially allowed them to challenge the entire proceeding
if they could show that it was wholly unreasonable and unresponsive to their needs. Why even that type of hearing should be given
if the Charities have no legal interest in the settlement struck between the ACLU and the City is far from self-evident. It could well
be "no legal interest" simply means "no right to attack" the decree. Nonetheless, the showing required to sustain such an attack
by an outsider who is not formally bound by the settlement is very
high. It is clearly not met by the simple showing that the Charities
opposed to their last breath the provisions of the consent decree to
which the ACLU and the City had agreed. Given that the proposed
decree acknowledged their free exercise interest, the fairness claim
did not provide the Charities any protection at the trial level. It
seems unlikely that the position would have changed even if the
Charities had taken an appeal, as the same showing required by
the fairness test would have to be made.2 1 The Charities are quite
understandably "furious" over the end run around their economic
and social position.22 In and of itself this could be no more than
the anguished cries of any disappointed litigant. But there is a social side to the story which requires telling as well.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING

The consent decree between the City and the ACLU raises
both legal and tactical issues. It is important to note that each of
the different types of constitutional challenges raised against the
cooperative agreement between te City and the Charities points
to very different remedial structures. Start with the Establishment
Clause claim. On its face the claim seems plausible. The Charities
had kept their religious orientation. Therefore, if the agreement
20

Fairness hearings, at which interested parties and amici may comment on the advan-

tages and disadvantages of a particular settlement arrangement, commonly are held by
judges to assist them in determining whether the proposed settlement is fair, adequate and
reasonable. Although such hearings are not explicitly required by Rule 23, courts generally
rely on them to comply with the Rule's requirement that they approve the dismissal or
settlement of class actions. See generally Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d
305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980). Indeed, in some cases, failure to hold a hearing could constitute an
abuse of judicial discretion. See Mendoza v. U.S., 623 F.2d 1338, 1348 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1980).
21 See Purnick, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1987 p. 29, col. 2 (cited in note 15), noting that the
remarks of Cardinal O'Connor suggested that the Archdiocese would not appeal. And as of
this writing, no appeal has been taken.
2 The word was used by Burt Neuborne in his presentation at the 1986 University of
Chicago Legal Forum symposium (see note 5).
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made available additional funds to provide better care for their coreligionists, then the agreement seems to "advance" religion in
ways that the Lemon test condemns. And it matters little whether
the additional moneys came in the form of direct payments from
the City or from the assumption by the City of certain obligations
which allowed the Charities to redeploy their own resources in new
directions. Second, any joint operation seems to call for extensive
cooperation between the City and the Charities, which could easily
rise to the "excessive government entanglement with religion" that
Lemon decries.
The recent cases, moreover, have taken a very hard look at
any shared financing arrangements between the state and the religious agencies. Grand Rapids School District. v. Ball,23 for example, invalidated a "Shared Time" program in which the City financed remedial reading programs for parochial school children on
the parochial school premises, even though there had been over the
years no detectable bias in the administration of the program. The
concern was that the religious teachers might "infuse" their instruction with religious messages in ways that ordinary evidence
could not detect. Similarly, in Aguilar v. Felton,24 the Court used
the Lemon tests to strike down programs funded by federal moneys under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965,25 whereby New York City parochial school students received guidance from volunteer public teachers on parochial school
premises. To be sure, one could argue that more entanglement is
allowable in a total care facility than in a school setting, if only
because the costs of separation of secular and religious activities is
higher. But that result is hardly foreordained given the evident
confusion in the present law. It is surely possible that the strict
standard from the school cases could carry over with enough vigor
to lead to the invalidation of the joint arrangement between the
City and the Charities for running any total-care facility. And the
judgment in Wilder avoided the clear thrust of these opinions by
subjecting the consent decree to a relaxed standard of review-comparable to that which appellate courts use in reviewing
jury determinations on matters of fact-that made it all but impossible to strike the decree down.26
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
22 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1982).
26 The District Court noted that GrandRapids and Aguilar could be read as simply the
23
2-

latest in a narrow line of cases involving state aid to nonpublic schools. Wilder, 645 F. Supp.
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Why then did the consent decree not call for this result? The
answer is that neither the City nor the ACLU wanted it. While the
lawsuit itself looks like an adversary proceeding, the interests of
the parties were in reality no more adverse than those of the buyer
and seller who executed a collusive common recovery at common
law.17 In order to understand the common interest between the
ACLU and the City, it is instructive to go back to the numbers set
out above. Under the Establishment Clause theory, the remedy
must be a return to the status quo ante. If the numbers above are
correct, then everyone is a net loser. The City children's level of
care is reduced from 10 to 5, while the Charity children reduce
from a care level of 24 to 20. In essence, the Establishment Clause
argument would undo all the joint benefits which the program has
hitherto provided. Clearly, it is neither in the interest of the City
nor the ACLU to pursue that course of action even if they regard
the black Protestant children as their sole clients.
The equal access theory has very different consequences for
the joint arrangement. On its face, this theory does not call for any
invalidation of the program; to the contrary, it only requires that
the benefits afforded to both Charity and City children be equal.
To understand the importance of that constraint, however, it is
useful to ask the question of how the City and the Charities would
bargain, ex ante, if the Establishment Clause claims were groundless while the equal access claims were irrefutable. Here I shall assume that there are no internal conflicts within either the City or
the Charities which would lead their bargaining agents to act

at 1331. Yet even this line was unconvincing to the district court, which recognized the
Supreme Court's preoccupation with subtle influences and the potential risks of sectarian
behavior. If anything, the establishment clause argument against either the preexisting arrangement or the proposed settlement should follow a fortiori from the Supreme Court's
opinions in Grand Rapids and Aguilar because of the pervasive religious nature of the child
care facilities and the extensive government supervision and support of their activities. The
opposite result was reached largely because of the onerous burden placed upon the objecting
defendants: "[t]he Court is not persuaded, however, that the proposed settlement clearly
violates the Establishment Clause when all relevant constitutional interests are taken into
account." Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1331. The relevant interest that weighed most heavily
upon the court was the free exercise claim of the Protestant children, which it thought
might justify the increased control over the Charities. Id. at 1338. Yet, the Supreme Court
precedents suggest that the effort to reconcile conflicting claims of members of different
religions only increases the fear of entanglement under Lemon. It seems evident that there
is something clearly amiss in the Supreme Court's analysis of Establishment Clause cases.
See generally McConnell, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (cited in note 13).
2" For the mechanics of these devices, which use judgments to secure transfers of rights
binding on third parties, see A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2d ed. 1986).
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against the interest 8 of their principals, so that each side bargains
in order to maximize solely the gains to its own constituents.
On these assumptions, the Charities and the City will be able
to enter into a gainful bargain only if each side is left better off
with the agreement than without it; otherwise why enter into the
agreement at all? On the numbers given, therefore, the Charities
must be able to receive benefits for affiliation that are greater than
20, while the City must receive benefits for its children that are
greater than 5. If this were the only effective constraint, then so
long as the transactions costs of reaching an agreement are less
than the gains provided, the two sides will enter into some affiliation agreement. Given that the Charities were, by assumption,
much better than the City at running child-care facilities, those
gains from trade seem to be large indeed. Hence, this is the probable explanation for the series of one-year contracts between the
Charities and the City.
The equal access requirement, if it had been made explicit ex
ante, would have had radically altered the bargaining relations between the parties. In order to achieve equal access, the ultimate
care level for both sides must be equal, notwithstanding the original gross disparities. The Charities would not, however, have consented to any arrangement which reduced the level of care which
they could provide for their coreligionists. It follows therefore that
the equal access condition and the mutual benefit condition both
can be satisfied only if the Charities and the City are each left
with net benefits of greater than the original level of care provided
by the Charities to their own coreligionists-20 in our example-after taking transaction costs into account.
It now becomes clear why any bargain would have been difficult to conclude. First, no bargain is possible unless the total net
gains are greater than 15-the City children must move from 5 to
20-for if they are less than 15, then equality cannot be met unless
the Charities accept some net loss. A wide range of Pareto-superior
outcomes are therefore precluded when the equality condition is
imposed ex ante-to wit, all bargains where the total benefits to
both sides are greater than 25 but less than 40. The numbers suggest this irony: the greater the initial inequality, the less likely it is
28 The assumption is clearly controversial with respect to the City, given that there was
a change of administration between the original formation of the contracts and the subsequent decision to enter into the consent decree. The change points up a systematic difficulty
in doing business with public bodies. The legal entity remains the same, but the persons
who govern it do not.
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that any bargain at all could be struck.
Second, the equal access condition necessarily requires that
there be a highly unequal division of the surplus even where bargains could be struck. The greater the initial inequality, the larger
the surplus necessary to have a viable bargain. In the instant illustration, the City must obtain 15 units of benefits before the Charities can obtain any. Thereafter the precise division of any additional gains is somewhat uncertain, assuming those gains could be
generated at all, net of transaction costs. Presumably, the constitutional constraint would require any gains in excess of 15 to be divided evenly. As the valuation of benefits from bargains is a tricky
business, it seems as though there would be few instances in which
the Charities could exceed the break-even point. Why then should
they contract at all?
The conclusion is quite clear. The equal access claim, asserted
ex ante, would have the probable effect of dooming all cooperative
efforts between the Charities and the City, precisely because of the
large differences in the levels of care that the two organizations
had been able to provide. Ironically, in practice the public insistence upon equal access ex ante would be likely to have the same
effect as prohibition of such joint arrangements as wholly illegal
under the Establishment Clause. There simply would be no bargains because the equality constraint would operate as a prohibitive tax on both the City and the Charities.
The bargaining games are very different if the equal access
claim is introduced into the picture only after the City and the
Charities have entered into some long-term arrangement. In order
to see why, it is critical to remember that there were no long-term
contracts between the City and the Charities that governed their
interactions.2 9 Instead the Charities made heavy long-term capital

investments in their own care facilities, which they knew could
only be covered if they received continued support from the
City-support which the City was not bound by contract to provide. At this point we have a classical situation in which one party
to a trading relationship makes long-term investments in specific
capital, which are funded by short term, discretionary cash payments from its trading partner. This type of relationship has been
extensively analyzed in the law and economics literature under the
heading of contractual opportunism or the expropriation of quasirents. 0 The theory works perfectly here.
11

See Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1344.

30 See, for example, Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian, Verti-
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The basic theme identified by this analysis runs as follows.
Where party A (the Charities) makes the long-term investment, it
runs the risk of an expropriation of its investment by its trading
partner, B (the City). The costs incurred in the original investment
are sunk, so that the opportunistic trading partner can demand a
set of favorable prices that does not permit the opposite side to
recoup its original costs over the life of the deal. The best (if not
only) way to prevent that risk from developing is to enter into a
long-term contractual arrangement whereby the continued support
from the trading partner is secured. It is the length of the mismatch of contractual commitments, not the nature of the underlying services, which sets up the problem.
An example from the literature illustrates the point.31 Suppose
there is an undeveloped mining site that can be developed only if
an exclusive railroad spur line is built. Before the mine is opened,
the railroad takes a substantial risk if it builds the spur solely on
the mining company's reputation for fair and responsible dealing.
That mining company, if not bound by a long-term contract, will
know that the railroad cannot convert its investment in track and
equipment to any other use. The mine therefore has the powerful
incentive to insist that it will do business with the railroad only if
it reduces its haulage charges to a level which is just above the
variable costs of haulage. Its threat is that if the railroad does not
accept that arrangement, it will not open the mine, or it will find
some other hauler to ship its ore to market. It should be noted that
the railroad need not necessarily lose all its sunk investment if it
has not protected itself by contract, for it may have some bargaining power of its own, especially if the other alternatives available
to the mine are not costless. Nonetheless, once the railroad has
built its spur, it finds itself in a "no win" situation because of its
heavy sunk costs. The only way in which the railroad can protect
itself ex ante is to enter into a long-term arrangement with the
mining company that protects its capital committed to the construction of the special spur line. And the mine, which wants to
have the track built, will normally be willing to enter into such an

cal Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
Econ. 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233 (1979). For applications, see Janet Kiholm Smith

and Steven R. Cox, The Pricing of Legal Services: A Contractual Solution to the Problem of
Bilateral Opportunism, 14 J. Legal Stud. 167 (1985); Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. Legal Stud. 265
(1984).
3'

Discussed in Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 270-86.
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agreement before the spur is built or the mine is opened. An agreement negotiated before either side commits its capital to a specific
venture will be far less traumatic, as the possibility of expropriation is substantially reduced.
There is of course a real question as to whether the Charities
left themselves open to this expropriation. If there had been any
type of understanding between the two sides about renewals, it
might have been possible for the Charities to have entered into the
suit as of right if they could have shown the breach of some
"master" agreement, which bound both sides to enter into renewals of the formal annual contracts.
It may well be that the informal understandings were quite
the opposite, so that the Charities took the conscious risk on renewal. If so, their great business mistake was to make long-term
investments on their side without receiving the protection of a
comparable long-term contract from the City. The Charities may
have been reassured by the City's reputation for fair dealing; they
may have been told informally not to worry about the renewal; or
they may have thought that long-term contracts cost too much to
negotiate, given that they would in any event have to have some
open terms to take into account future, uncertain events. Both
sides could expect some incremental change in the nature of the
relation, for example, if and when the levels of City funding of the
Charities increased. But whatever the reason, without the longterm protection, the Charities exposed themselves to an expropriation by the City of their wealth once the equal access claim was
raised ex post. Here, as with the railroad spur line, the payoff
structures are quite different from what they were before. If the
agreement had, for example, provided benefits of 24 for the Charities, and 10 for the City, then the ex post equal access claim would
work to raise the share of the City to 17 and to reduce that of the
Charities to 17 as well. The Charities not only lose their anticipated gain from contract, but they are left worse off (by 3 units)
than they were ex ante, even on the assumption that their transaction costs were zero.32 Since the stakes in this bargaining game are
"2Note the assumption

in the text is made for simplification of the analysis. It is quite

possible that the gains from the original contract arrangement were so great that the City's
belated insistence on equality could have left the Charities with a net gain from the transaction-that is, on the numbers originally given, a level of care greater than 20. The shift in
payoffs will, however, be very substantial whether or not the Charities' welfare is reduced
below its initial endowment level of 20, and the litigation will produce exactly the same type
of factional struggle that we have here, given the massive disagreement between the two
sides. In addition, if one had to guess, the issue of equal access seems so hotly contested that
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extensive, these transaction costs are not only positive but large as
well. If they were set at 3 units for each party, for example, then
the total loss to the charity is now 6. If the City's costs were the
same, then its gains are also reduced to 14, but its net overall gain
is still substantial, 4 units (14 minus 10).
Thus far the argument has not accounted for the critical role
of the ACLU in this bargaining game. To understand its role, we
must ask how the City can achieve its bargaining goal of equalizing
access to the system-that is, of trying to develop a payoff structure which (in the example given) yields 17 units of net benefits to
both it and the Charities. If the City simply announces that it demands a renegotiation of its joint care arrangement with the Charities, it will be met with powerful resistance on the other side. The
Charities clearly have some political clout of their own, and they
also could claim with considerable force that there was a clear, albeit unenforceable, understanding that contract renewals occurred
as a matter of course. The elusive idea of a "moral" obligation to
continue business is a powerful one for long-term relations, even in
politics. In addition, the Charities have bargaining levers of their
own. They could insist that the original agreement was unfair and
should be renegotiated in their favor, to provide say a 26 to 8 split
in benefits. The City may be able to overcome that reply, but it is
not clear ex ante that its potential gains are worth the additional
costs required for the fight. The institutional situation may be stable even though the contracts run year-to-year. Indeed, this was
the case before the litigation ensued.
The suit by the ACLU changes the bargaining game, at least if
the consent decree can be entered over the objections of the Charities, as Wilder held. More concretely, the decree now binds the
City so as to require that it only accept a deal which provides for a
17 to 17 distribution of the net gain. It is a classic case of successful precommitment, which allows the side that binds itself to gain
the lion's share of the cooperative surplus. The vital point is that
the agreement with the ACLU prevents the City from making any
concessions that might otherwise be demanded from it within the
political framework. By casting the agreement between the plaintiffs and the City as a consent judgment binding the City, the
ACLU thereby improves the City's bargaining position vis-a-vis
the Charities. Without this constraint the new distribution of outcomes could have been anywhere from 6 for the City, and 28 for
it is quite plausible to believe that the Charities would never have entered the original cooperative arrangement if they thought that this question could have been put on the table.
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the Charities, or 13 for the City and 21 for the Charities. The former holds if the City captures the surplus, and the latter if the
Charities do. Now that the consent decree is in place, the range
takes on a very different form: at first approximation 17 to 17,
only. It becomes easy, therefore, to understand why the City and
the ACLU were able to reach an agreement, first, to drop the Establishment Clause case and, second, to accept unequivocally the
equal access element. They were on the same side of the case for
both those issues.
Nonetheless, it is not entirely certain that the City and the
ACLU will be able to achieve the equal division of resources that
their consent decree contemplates, as there is still another round
to the bargaining game. The Charities are still not parties to the
decree, and while their bargaining position has been sharply compromised, it has not been totally destroyed. Thus, the Charities are
still not bound to continue with the arrangement at all. They could
simply decide to throw up their hands and say that they will go it
alone, as Cardinal O'Connor has publicly stated. 3 If that happened, the results for both sides would be truly disastrous. The
Charities could not go it alone and could only provide, say, 10
units in benefits to their coreligionists. The City would be forced to
operate its own child-care facilities, so that the care levels for its
children would reduce, at best to the 5 units that existed before it
had entered into the contract, and probably below that. Now the
possibility of bargaining breakdown is such that the belated acceptance of the equal access principle might result not in 34 units
of total service, but in 15 or fewer units, divided unequally between the City and the Charities. In an odd sense, therefore, the
bargaining range remained quite large yet the set of possible outcomes for both sides were worse than they were before.
Once the consent decree is entered, the Charities might seek
to keep their original position. They must, however, be able to exert some threat against the City to make their opposition credible.
The only possible approach is to threaten to adopt a "scorched
earth" posture to derail the consent decree. It is an open question
whether any such threats could be taken at face value given the
enormous amounts that the Charities have to lose. Yet the position
may not be the same here for the Catholic as for the Jewish Charities for reasons that no outsider could easily understand or predict.
It is therefore very difficult to decide whether and if the Charities
" Purnick, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1987 p. 29, col. 2 (cited in note 15).
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are bluffing, or whether they will blink first and accept some
smaller expropriation from the decree in order to avoid the larger
loss.
Either way there will be substantial dislocation. No matter
what the exact path of negotiations, the destructive scenarios
promised in Wilder hardly offer a strong endorsement of public
interest litigation. The success of the child care jointly provided by
the City and the Charities depends on the faith and trust that are
essential for the operation of all long-term, or "relational" contracts. It is difficult to understand how that trust could possibly
flourish, or even survive, given the battering that the relationship
has received in Wilder.
IV.

CONTRACT OR CONSENT DECREE

One remaining question is why the ACLU and the City chose
to seek a consent decree. They could have entered into a contract
that specified the terms on which the City can do business with the
Charities. In principle those terms could imitate those in the consent decree, and thus allow the City to precommit and to extract
critical concessions from the Charities. If so, it seems to follow that
the consent decree does nothing more than a contract would do.
On this view, political and social commentary and not legal issues
should dominate the agenda.
Yet I suspect that there is more to the complete analysis. One
must ask why the City and the ACLU want the consent decree if
they could have obtained all their objectives through a contract.
Judicial proceedings were costly and protracted, and risked at least
minimal third-party involvement in the fairness hearings. If the
contract alternative was cheaper than the consent decree, both
sides would have been well-advised to adopt it. As they did not,
the question is what did they hope to gain that made it wise for
them to have incurred the additional costs and risks of a lawsuit.
Part of the explanation has to do with the theory of contract
as it applies to both private and public parties. In private law, the
institution of contract is often said to rest on the idea that values
are subjective. In Hobbes's famous formulation, "[t]he value of all
things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors; and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented
to give." 34 In every exchange each party gives up something that it
values less in order to acquire something that it values more. The

34

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 15 (1651).
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question of value is internal and subjective. The legal system does
not try to monitor those subjective valuations directly but instead
rests upon a sensible, rough and ready assumption that each party
knows its own interest. As a result, consent (cases of force, fraud
and incompetence aside) is conclusive evidence that each party believes that it has gained from the exchange. The legal system
makes no effort to determine which needs are appropriate and
which are not. The courts simply do their best to follow the road
map which is set out by the parties.
Accordingly, the City and the ACLU could have entered into
any agreement they pleased. They could have been quite explicit
about their intentions as well. A hypothetical contract could read:
"Whereas both sides desire to regulate the relationships that the
City has with certain named Charities on a year-to-year basis, the
following agreement is set by the parties." And the contract could
then provide that the City would be required to make extensive
payments into the ACLU coffers, all by way of liquidated damages,
to the extent that it later breaches.
Any agreement of that form seems to have real advantages
over the consent decree. One critical point is that the simple contract totally dispenses with any need to show that there was something improper, much less unconstitutional, about the City's prior
course of dealing with the Charities. There would be no occasion
for the ACLU to raise the thorny questions of equal access, free
exercise or establishment. It could concede that the original understandings between the City and the Charities were perfectly
proper, and glory in its ability to exploit the opening left in the
previous casual way of doing business. After all it is only the "appetite" of the parties which insures the fairness of the exchange.
This strategy does not sit well, however, because the City does
not have the absolute freedom of contract. The subjective theory
of value, which works quite well for two private persons, A and B,
does not apply to the City, which is far from an atomistic person.
Instead, the City is a complex network of institutional arrangements, each of which places effective fiduciary obligations upon
City officials. As a public office is a public trust, City officials cannot act simply as their appetites might direct. They must have reasons for their actions as they are accountable to other people in
other arenas. They cannot act on the basis of naked will-they
must show cause. In this case, resort to the judicial process provides the cause to justify the course of conduct. Now the City lawyers are no longer engaged in simple business opportunism that
befits a robber baron. They have recognized that their past con-
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duct was wrongful and have taken prudent, limited responses to
correct their errors. The use of the judicial process and the consent
decree thus powerfully legitimates what might otherwise be condemned as a misuse of public office.
The second advantage is closely tied to the first. Given that
the City is a complex organization and not a single individual, it is
necessary to determine who should act as its agent on any particular occasion. It might be the City Council, or perhaps whatever
government department that had negotiated the original contracts
or their renewals. The City Corporation Counsel would have some
say in the matter, but perforce it would have far less control over
those contract renegotiations than it would have over litigation in
which the City is named as a party defendant. By bringing suit
against the City, the ACLU was thus able to select the individuals
within the City with whom it had to do business. The matter was
now one of constitutional law, and not one of general policy. The
settlement therefore assumes the color of a judicial act, and less
the color of a political one. In a word the political process is bypassed. It is all well and good to say that the Charities could not
have challenged the agreement if it had been arrived at through
the political process, so why should they be in a better position if it
is made through the judicial process? But that objection assumes
that the outcome of the negotiations would have been the same in
the two different forums. The shift from contracting to litigation
reduced the Charities' chances of success. In so doing, it gave additional reasons why it was wise for the ACLU to use litigation instead of negotiation.
Indeed the reasons may go deeper. Suppose the City had decided to enter into a long-term contract with the ACLU about future City contracts with the Charities. Is it so clear that the City
has the power to enter into this agreement? 35 If the matter is
purely legislative, it is at least an open question whether the City
can delegate to any private organization the power to determine
future City policy.-6
Surely there would be something amiss if the City Council
passed an ordinance which made the ACLU the City's agent in any
" For a good general discussion of this question, see Peter M. Shane, Policy Making by
Consent Decree, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 241; and Michael W. McConnell, Why Have Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal
F. 295 (responding to Shane). Given the difficulties we encounter in the outcome of the
Wilder litigation, the use of consent decrees may insulate policies not only from political
change, but constitutional attack as well.
'" See Schechter Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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future negotiations between the City and the Charities. The ACLU
represents only a tiny section of the public, so that any delegation
to it would have resulted in a radical shift in the choice of the
City's agents. Why then is it appropriate to allow the City to enter
into a once-and-for-all contract with the ACLU, which binds present as well as future administrations? Might such contracts be
necessary for the funding of capital improvements? Yet even then,
each administration has a chance to bind some other future administrations, as new projects are always being considered. The steadiness of the flow means that no administration can dominate its
successors. The Wilder decree, however, is designed to foreclose all
future innovation in that area. There is an old observation about
the way in which subpoenas are used to "protect" willing witnesses
from the charge that they eagerly testified against their friends.
Here, the consent decree gets the City some protection against the
otherwise telling criticism that government activity is arbitrary
and capricious.
V.

INTERVENTION AND SUBSTANCE

A. Intervention
On the procedural side, the problem lies with the standards
appropriate for legal intervention. The traditional view is that intervention is to be allowed as a matter of right only if the intervenor has some "legal interest" at stake in the litigation. In the
ordinary case the legal interest is an interest in real property or in
a contract right between the two parties 8 In Wilder, for example,
37 There may be other strategic advantages that consent decrees give against third parties. As Professor Laycock has observed, the consent decree gives at the very least the illusion of a comprehensive settlement of the case, and it opens use of contempt sanctions
against the City if it (i.e., the next administration) wants to back off the decree. It might
also raise the costs to the Charities if they tried to bring any independent action to chal-

lenge the legality of the decree. See Laycock, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 106-8 (cited in note 1).
I suspect that the reasons developed in the text carry more weight in this particular context
at least. What is clear is that there must be some explanation as to why consent decrees are
preferred to contracts, for why else would parties use them?
11 There are other types of interests that might be involved as well, for example the
rights of all persons to have access to public schools, as was an issue in Harrisburg Ch. of
Am. Civ. Lib. Union v. Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983). There the court disal-

lowed a consent decree between the ACLU and the state which precluded certain religious
organizations from having access to public schools. See also the consent decree in Local
Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3079-80 (1986), in which the white

firefighters had arguable rights under the various collective bargaining statutes. Nonetheless
the Court approved of the consent decree between the Vanguards, an organization of black
firefighters, and the City without the consent of the Union. See also Samayoa By Samayoa
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 798 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied #86-1355 (Easterbrook,
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it seems undeniable that the Charities could have intervened as a
matter of right if they had entered into a long-term contract with
the City which might not survive the equal access claim.39 This
standard of legal intervention is sufficient to allow persons a
chance to defend themselves in court where there is a threat of
partial confiscation of their property and wealth. It might have
been applicable here if the Charities could have argued that there
was some "implied master contract" whose terms were necessarily
compromised by the terms of the consent decree. But the district
court was quite insistent that no legal obligation was generated by
any course of dealing, given the rapid changes in the ethnic composition of New York City and its policy toward child care
40
generally.
Still, should the legal position of the Charities depend upon
whether they can make out such an implied agreement? Note the
source of the dilemma. At one level it seems clearly improper to
allow intervention by any C who is "adversely affected" by a judgment between A and B. The settlement of any large antitrust suit,
for example, will affect the price that consumers might have to pay
for certain goods, and yet their uniform intervention is normally
not tolerated in any legal proceeding. If any venture beyond the
traditional category of legal interest necessarily entailed that all
third persons who thought themselves worse off could intervene,
then the legal system would grind to a halt. The legal interest approach may be too narrow, but surely that is preferable to an
overly broad approach.
Nonetheless, there are costs that result from ignoring those
cases where bargaining strategies between A and B are designed to
expropriate the long-term investments of C, which were (unwisely)
left unprotected by contract. The key point here is that intervenJ. dissenting), where the settlement which allocated places in desirable Chicago city schools,
entered into between the Chicago School Board and the federal government, was held to
preclude an attack on the decree brought by a student who was denied access to a particular
school by the terms of that decree.
These cases all raise the real question of the relative positions of cart and horse. If the
religious students in Scanlon, the white union workers in Local Number 93 or individual
students in Samayoa have no rights, then why should they be allowed to intervene? But
where their claim looks at least plausible, then they should be allowed to intervene as of
right to see whether the substantive claims are established.
39 The point was well recognized by the district court: "the Stipulation could not be
approved over the objection of most of the defendant agencies if it altered specific contractual rights of the agencies that the City or SSC could not otherwise abridge, for example by
ordinance or new agency regulations." Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1343.
40 Id. at 1343.
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tion as of right could only be extended to persons at risk for expropriation. Members of the general public, who have not made any
specific investments in dealing with the City, could not intervene
as of right under this standard. To be sure, some people may be
left worse off by the consent decree, but ex ante there is some substantial probability that these same people will be left better off as
well. In any event, their stake seems so small that there is hardly
any reason to allow them to intervene, as they do not face the extensive and systematic risk consciously imposed upon the Charities
in this case, for which the fairness hearings provide but scant
protection.4'
I am not quite sure whether this proposal to tie standing to
the risk of expropriation is generally workable. But I do think that
in this case intervention might be allowed on another ground,
which would be open to the Charities as well as members of the
general public. The normal settlement dispute involves a controversy between two parties over a sum of money owed by one to the
other, or the status of title to some asset. If we applied the rules of
standing as applicable to private parties, we might conclude that
strangers to the contract cannot challenge its settlement, no matter
what their economic stake in the outcome. But Wilder did not involve a private contract between A and B. One party represented
the state, and was subject to the limitations on actions which are
generally contained in the Constitution. And there is a serious
question whether the consent decree requires an impermissible entanglement of religious and secular activities. That matter should
be resolved. Today the general law of standing is such that citizens
and taxpayers generally are not allowed to challenge government
actions simply because they are ultra vires. Usually it is necessary
to show the infringement of some interest in property or contract
at common law.4 2 There is something of a muddled exception to
this rule in the Establishment Clause cases which, under Flast v.
Cohen,43 allowed taxpayers to challenge public school expenditures

41

It should be noted, for example, that the consent decree specifies that the City shall

have powerful controls over the placement decisions of individual children into particular
care facilities, something which the charities had previously been able to decide pretty much
for themselves. Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1305-06 ("SSC would have final administrative authority over all placement decisions '[s]ubject to the terms of [the] Stipulation,' and would
reimburse agencies only for placements made according to the Stipulation's terms.") The
decision thus works to expand the control and influence of the SSC.
42 See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1723-24 (1975).
-' 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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because of "a logical nexus between the status asserted and the
claim sought to be adjudicated.""" Flast is largely unintelligible because it is an effort by the Court to carve out a narrow exception to
the general rule that denies taxpayer standing. Under the more
sensible approach, standing should be recognized in any case
wherein the plaintiff seeks an injunction against government action
which is claimed to exceed its constitutional authority. By that
view there is little reason to be concerned with the obscure linguistic refinements in Flast.
The nature of the concern is well illustrated by the recent Establishment Clause case, Valley Forge College v. Americans
United,45 where the grant of private property to a religious organization could not be challenged by another organization dedicated
to the principle of separation of church and state. The only conceivable person who might have a recognized interest is the next
highest bidder for property so conveyed (assuming there is one);
but his interest would be limited to the difference between its private valuation of the property and the amount he had bid to acquire it. This bidder would hardly be interested in pursuing the
structural issues that are raised in the case. Here the interested
political group is surely in a better position to litigate the issue
than anyone else, and to bring to it that "concrete adverseness"
that the traditional doctrines of standing are thought to advance.
A private law analogy might help. Ordinarily, a corporate
shareholder should surely be allowed to attack any action of the
corporation as ultra vires, without showing any special injury or
harm. There is no obvious reason why any standing doctrine
should require a different result in this case, where the matters of
institutional structure, and distribution of powers, are paramount
to all parties. If this is correct, then ironically the Charities do not
have to claim any special status to challenge the agreement under
the Establishment Clause. They, or any of their individual members, should be allowed to challenge the agreement without regard
to their special status, so long as they seek to enjoin actions that
are beyond the power of government to perform. Indeed, if they
are not let in, then we have the tragic situation in which a major
realignment of government power-which raises serious questions
under the Establishment Clause-can be challenged by no one at
all. Surely in a system of limited government, these constitutional
questions deserve some judicial resolution.
"

Id. at 102.
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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B. Substance
The second substantive question goes to the soundness of the
equal access claims. Stated otherwise, did the preexisting contracts
between the City and the Charities offend the Equal Protection
Clause because they did not provide for equal access to all children
within the system? Both the City and the ACLU regarded this
claim as self-evident, if only because race is a deeply suspect classification which correlated highly with the distinction between Charity and City children. The argument can be cast into symbolic
terms: 46 no City funds should be invested in programs that treat
these children differently. The point has its most vivid application
if the levels of care that various children receive differ in some substantial degree. But they are also raised by the equal access cases
that dominated the case.
I am far from sure that this constitutional challenge to the
prior practices of the City and the Charities has merit. The problem lies in finding the proper baseline by which to measure the
equal protection claim. Assume that a religious charity is prepared
to give A, its coreligionist, 10 units of support, but to give none to
B, a stranger. Assume that the City has 20 units of support of its
own to allocate. Does the Equal Protection Clause require that the
City contribute only 5 units to the coreligionist and 15 to B? This
is the equality of outcome, notwithstanding differences in initial
position. Alternatively, does it require that the City give 10 units
of benefit to both A and B, so as not to disturb the original imbalance which was created solely by a selective private generosity typical of most charitable giving? The problem here is that the Equal
Protection Clause demands generally that like cases be treated
alike; but it does not make the same command with respect to unlike cases. Are the positions of A and B alike, or different? Does
one look solely at the ultimate distribution of benefits, without
taking into account the source of funds? Or does one look at some
ratio between the two of them?
In the context of Wilder v. Bernstein, the best answer seems
48 Symbolic arguments are always difficult to deal with. Here there are two such

problems. First, there are many symbols generated by this case, including the message of
indifference and hostility that the City shows to the Jewish and Catholic charities. Second,
there are real costs to needy people if the overall level and quality of care actually provided
are reduced. The situation in New York would clearly be better if the imbalance between
the Jewish and Catholic Charities on the one hand, and Protestant charities on the other,
could be redressed, even in part, by some increase in Protestant charitable activity in New
York City.
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to be that the Equal Protection Clause is not offended when the
state enters into a contract with a private party which promises to
improve the position of all children in both the public and the religious systems. Surely if we dealt with public aid to education, it
would be odd to insist that religious schools could not give any
preference to their own members once they accept any government
assistance. As a general matter, it seems very difficult to insist that
the state is under a duty to redress all inequalities in wealth as a
precondition for providing any public aid for all its citizens. It is of
course utterly unthinkable that the state could make differential
uses of its own resources, based on race or religion, so it is hardly
the case that the restrictive interpretation advanced here reads the
Equal Protection Clause out of the Constitution. But Wilder does
not present any such issue. Where the City and the Charities have
entered into bargains that work general Pareto improvements,
therefore, it seems most unwise to strike down that claim on the
ground that it does not guarantee equal access to all individuals to
facilities under their joint care. To recognize the equal access claim
ex ante is to impose substantial, if not fatal, restrictions upon the
capacity of the City to improve the level of care that it provides.
To impose them ex post is to double-cross (legally, of course) the
Charities, to work a substantial expropriation of their committed
resources, and to threaten the durability of the cooperative arrangements that the City and Charities have developed over the
years. The consent decree between the City and the ACLU was a
masterful piece of lawyering: the Charities were powerfully restricted from ever having a chance to argue their case in full on the
merits. And there is no obvious reason why the result is wrong, at
least given the structure of existing law.
Wilder v. Bernstein shows in the most vivid form possible how
risky it is today to rely upon informal understandings or past practices in fashioning long-term, stable relations. It shows how socalled public interest litigation can undo the ties that bind. The
successful litigation strategies of the City and the ACLU in Wilder
have adverse consequences that go beyond the institutional dislocations that will result in that particular case. The decision gives a
clear signal that long-term, fragile social arrangements can be undone by sustained legal assault. Other private and religious entities
can be expected to alter their conduct to take into account the increased risks of resting business arrangements on informal understandings. Wilder thus forces us all to bear the heavy costs of the
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increasing legalization of social relations. And it was all so
avoidable.47

47 Or so I might have thought before reading the brief responses prepared by Messrs.
Neuborne and Schwarz. Their silence on crucial issues speaks volumes for their position.
Neither explains how their desired system of equal access could have been obtained by prospective voluntary negotiations between the City and the Charities. Neither recognizes that
the greater the initial inequalities, the less the City can do to help black children, if all
children must get equal after-the-fact care. And neither justifies transferring negotiations on
contract renewal from the political to the legal realm.
Both papers also seriously misrepresent my own position. Professor Neuborne writes,
"Professor Epstein argues that the aggregate utility was diminished by the settlement because the white, in-religion children suffered a greater loss in utility than the black, out-ofreligion children gained." Burt Newborne and Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Two Brief Responses to Professor Epstein, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 235, 235. Everything after the "because"
is wrong. First, he ignores all ex ante arguments, where my point is that both black and
white children benefited from the preexisting arrangements. Neuborne chides me for the
failure to justify the numbers used to analyze the social losses of the Wilder, but he fails to
understand that nothing of principle turns on the numbers chosen. My analysis depends
only on the fact that one group has an ex ante utility, a, which is greater than the ex ante
utility, b, of the second group. If any bargain between the two parties must result in both
having an equal utilities ex post, then it necessarily follows that all bargains with a surplus
of less than a-b will never take place, because the first party will not consent to any arrangement that leaves it with a utility of c<a. The foregone gains of a-b are a social loss.
Finally, Neuborne also blunders in dealing with the ex post arguments. My argument is
that even if one (as one should) values the utility of all children equally, the total wealth in
the system will be reduced by the costs of litigation and the disruption of long-term care
arrangements, as has happened. With less total wealth, less can be done for all children, and
hence the overall utility loss.
For his part, Mr. Schwarz gave some explanation as to why the City fought the Establishment Clause claim raised by the ACLU. But he gives no explanation as to why it did not
resist the equal access claim. Clearly, Mr. Schwarz regards the City's position as wholly
untenable; indeed, he goes so far as to raise the spectre that my criticism of the City's legal
position in "Wilder could just as well serve as an attack upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education." Id. at 237. His point is absurd, unless he thinks that
segregation in the South did improve, and was intended to improve, the position of black
children in public school systems. His unfortunate analogy inflames and misleads, but does
not inform.
Neuborne and Schwarz both appeal to certain noneconomic values, notably "equality"
and "freedom of religion." As to the first, they show no awareness of the serious baseline
problems that have to be addressed. As to the latter, their conception of "freedom of religion" apparently requires Catholic charities to counsel Protestant children on birth control
and abortion, all in the name of "family planning."
Neuborne ends with a high-minded appeal: "Bread is important; but so are roses."
Strange, when the consent decree in Wilder means that all children will get less of both.
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